Full Length Research Article

A PAIR OF OPPOSITE SECURITY ISSUES IN THE HORN OF AFRICA: HUMAN SECURITY VERSUS REGIME SECURITY IN ETHIOPIA AND SUDAN

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ABSTRACT

This commentary attempts to analyze the status of the two contradictory security issues of regime verse human security in the Horn of Africa. In this sub region, regime security is about the survival of the ruling elite and keeping of power in the hands of a specific clique of people and their cronies. Human security is about the welfare of the individuals rather than the defense of ruling elites. As the political state of affairs attested in the Horn of Africa, contrastingly regime security is the antithesis of human security and governments in the region are currently subscribed to giving priority to their regime survival. In terms of scope, this paper focuses only the time framework of 1991-2010 periods of these two countries. The paper identifies the negative role that the authoritarian regimes in both Ethiopia and Sudan played to achieve regime security at the expense of their citizens' human security. This article argued that in the Horn of Africa sub-region, the realization of the first is the deterioration of the latter.

INTRODUCTION

The security situation in Horn of Africa in the post-1990s was extraordinarily volatile. In this sub-region, the security of states is knit together into a kind of common destiny of security quagmires (Mukwaya, 2004). One specific feature of this area in particular is its security complexes (Wiberg, 2008). In this sub-region, the security of states is related to each other. In fact, Ethiopia is at the center and the area is defined by the security linkage between Ethiopia and its neighbors (Lyons, 1990). Each of the member states in this area shares a border with this core state. Most of the period up to the early 1990s in their security situation 'there were two main stories of security interaction…th elinked civil wars in Sudan and Ethiopia, and an interstate conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia over possession of the Ogaden region' (Buzan & Wæver, 2003, p.241). The contemporary security situations in these two states mainly revolve around internal weakness and vulnerability, democratic deficit, internal and external threats. Taking the source of threat, the issue of security in these states could be categorized as domestic and external for the purpose

of analysis. Regimes in many African countries are usually concerned with their immediate survival (Bakhit, 2002). Unlike the West, state security concepts in Africa are strongly influenced by the quest for regime survival. As a result, security policies in Africa are not so much about protection against external military threats but against internal challenges. As Cilliers (2004) points out, in a number of African countries, state security are equated with that of the governing élite 'governing' in the interests of their own preservation and advancement, and with limited provision of human security for their citizens. However, human security is should be given the top priority rather than the defense of ruling elites. This paper is intended to explain why these two regimes resort to trade their own regime survivals at the expense of their citizen's human security.

Conceptual Discussion on Regime and Human Security

In most Sub-Saharan Africa countries, state and regime are fused together and one cannot speak of the regime without speaking about the state (Holm, 2003). The explanation of such synthesis of state and regime is captured by Sasley (2002a, p. 17) who argues that 'in many developing countries and particularly in.... [Africa], the difference between state and

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regime is negligible. The construction of state institutions (bureaucracies, militaries, parties, and domestic security services) is often created by regimes in power to help maintain them in power'. He also goes on to say that regime like Ethiopia and Sudan which are 'narrowly-based regimes insert into the top positions of these institutions officials who are tied to the regime through family, tribe, ethnicity, or religion (depending on the regime's own base of support). Thus, state institutions serve the needs of the regime, so that the two become indistinguishable' (ibid.). Holm (2003, p. 270) also noted that in the Third world, 'the two concepts [state and regime] are inherently linked to each other. If the concept of state is disconnected from the concept of regime, the regime will try to 'securities' both state and regime in order to survive as incarnation of the state…Any opposition to the regime has been stated in terms of threats to the state and thereby to the regime'.

Regime Security

It is, therefore, worthy to note that state security in the context of the Third World could be defined as 'a condition where the institutions, processes and structures of the state are able to continue functioning without the threat of collapse or significant opposition, despite threats to the current regime or changes to the make-up of the ruling elite' (Jackson, 2007, p. 148). Here, regime is defined as a small set of ruling coalition or an alliance of dominant ideological, economic, and military actors, coordinated by the rulers of the state (Mann, 1993; Job, 1992; Ryan, 2009). Jackson (2007, p. 148) defines regime security as 'a condition where the governing elites are secure from the threat of forced removal from office and can generally rule without major challenges to their authority'. Parallel to this definition, Al-Sayyid (1999, p. 48) also refers to regime security as the 'maintenance of the core values of the regime, especially maintenance of its basic rules and institutions'. When the ruling elites in the Third World face internal threats to their survival, they may use foreign policy in addition to domestic tools to enhance their political security (Clapham, 1996; Clark, 2001; Sasley, 2002b; Fravel, 2003; Mohamedou, 2003) by soliciting support from powerful global actors. As Jackson (2007, p. 154-155) underscores that 'a great many weak state rulers have successfully managed the transition to multiparty democracy and retained control of the state, primarily through careful manipulation of internal opponents and external perceptions. Typically, this involved monopolising and controlling the media, the co-option of opponents, setting up fake parties to split the vote, gerrymandering, ballot-rigging, candidate and elector disqualification and manipulating the electoral rules. Constructing the outward appearance of democracy without any substantial concessions can actually function to bolster regime security by giving it a degree of international legitimacy'. As Jackson has correctly observed, the above strategies of the regime in the Third World state are the internal means that the ruling elites execute to promote their partisan interests.

Human Security

The concept of human security is much debated and controversial (Owen, 2008). It has been given varying definitions by international organizations, governments and scholars (Oberleitner, 2002). The concept of human security first originated as part of the holistic paradigm of human development cultivated in the UNDP by Mahbub Ul Hag (Jolly & Ray, 2006). However, as an extension of the human development paradigm the official launching of the concept in the global arena is accredited to the UNDP's 1994 Human Development Report. The report gave concrete expression to, and was later used to popularize, the notion of human security (Tadjbakhsh, 2005; Hendricks, 2006). The document argued for a new concept of security that equated security with people, rather than territories or states (Ostergard, 2002). It seeks to shift the meaning of security away from its traditionally military–oriented and state-centered focus. Accordingly, the report envisages 'human security in the sense that the individual is at the receiving end of all security concerns' (Floyd, 2007, p. 40). It characterized human security as 'freedom from fear and freedom from want', which can be said to have two main aspects. First, it means safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease, and repression. Second, it means protection from sudden and harmful disruption in the pattern of life (Hampson & Penny, 2007).

The report defined human security as the 'summation of seven dimensions of security: economic, food, health, environment, personal, community, and political' (MacFarlane & Khong, 2006, p. 146). These components make the definition of human security all-encompassing. It is distinct from the traditional and narrow concept of security (Shinoda, 2004) in the sense that the human security conceptualization is broadened along vertical and horizontal dimensions. The so called the '"horizontal broadening" referred to including other security dimensions next to political and military, such as environmental, economic, health, social, etc., while the "vertical broadening" referred to including other referent objects next to the state' (Prezelj, 2008, p. 9).The UNDP report on human security has four core elements. It is people-centered, multi-dimensional, interconnected, and universal (Ostergard, 2002; Jolly & Ray, 2006; Taylor, 2008; UNDP, 1994). As a people-centered concept, it places the individual at the 'center of analyses. As it seeks to address the complex issues that inform contemporarily insecurities, it is multi-dimensional and it is interconnected by recognizing that threat to one pose a threat to all. Its universal nature is caused by its relevance to people everywhere, in rich nations and poor alike (ibid.).

Consequently, the concept of human security 'represents a significant paradigm shift for scholars and practitioners working in field of development, democracy, human rights and humanitarian assistance' (Landman, 2006. P. 14). It also became a central theme of a number of international and regional organizations, academic institutions, governments of different regions through their foreign policies (Sané, 2008). In particular, the Canadian, Japanese and Norwegian governments spearheaded the institutionalization of human security concerns into their respective foreign policies (Behringr, 2005; Menon, 2007; Jolly & Ray, 2006). Apart from its adoption as a new security theme in the workings of those governmental, intergovernmental and international non-governmental organizations, there is no as such widely accepted universal definition of human security. However, based on the UNDP definition of human security, currently they are broad and narrow approaches to conceptualize the

term human security (Amouyel, 2006; Liotta & Owen, 2006; McCormack, 2008; Tadjbakhsh, 2009). The narrow conception of human security is focusing on 'freedom from fear' and factors that perpetuate violence (Owen, 2004). This definition is also called the 'Canadian Approach' and adopted by both Canada and Norway (Ferreira & Henk, 2009; Liotta & Owen, 2006). In this approach, human security is defined as 'freedom from pervasive threats to people's rights, their safety, or even their lives', and the key strategies for strengthening human security are identified as 'strengthening legal norms and building the capacity to enforce them' (DFAIT, 1999, p. 4). The broad definition of human security is based on three ideas of 'freedom from want', 'freedom from fear' and 'freedom from indignity'. This approach is adopted by the governments of Japan, South Africa, and various United Nations affiliated organizations. Trust Fund for Human Security (2004, p. 185) noted that 'the concept of "human security"…means in addition to providing national protection, focusing on each and every person, eliminating threats to people through cooperation by various countries, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and civil society, and striving to strengthen the capacity of people and society so as to enable people to lead self-sufficient lives'. Within the wider conceptualization, the Commission on Human Security (2003, p. 4) also defines human security comprehensively and it 'means protecting fundamental freedoms – freedoms that are the essence of life. It means protecting people from critical (severe) and pervasive (widespread) threats and situations. It means using processes that build on people's strengths and aspirations. It means creating political, social, environmental, economic, military and cultural systems that together give people the building blocks of survival, livelihood and dignity'. For the sake of this paper, I adopted the definition of human security from two angles: the freedom from fear and freedom from want.

Regime Security in Ethiopia and Sudan

Regime security is about the survival of the ruling elite and keeping of power in the hands of a specific clique of people and their cronies, whereas, human security is about the welfare of the individuals rather than the defense of ruling elites (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2004). As the political state of affairs attested in the Horn of Africa, contrastingly regime security is the antithesis of human security. In this sub-region, the realization of the first is the deterioration of the latter (Hutchful, 2005). Governments in the region still subscribe to giving priority to their regime survival. As Medhane (2003, p. 108) stated, in this region, 'in reality, state security amounts to little more than regime security…the principal sources of people insecurity is their own government rather than foreign aggression'. So, taking regime security as its focus of analysis, the subsequent section treats this security concern of the incumbent governments in Ethiopia and Sudan.

The Case of Regime Security in Ethiopia

As far as the last one and half decade rule of the Ethiopian People Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) is concerned, 'one basic feature of the ruling party's policy… a mismatch between what is official and textual on one hand and the practice and the real thinking of the…regime on the other' (Melakou, 2007, p. 118). For instance, at the formal level, the

EPRDF regime adamantly declared that the alpha and omega of its national security policy and strategy is to protect Ethiopia's national interests and to ensure its survival as a country (Ministry of Information Press & Audiovisual Department, 2002). Despite this rhetoric, one could understand from the prevailing reality of the regime's performance, the core objective of its security strategy is to ensure its own survival. The political environment has been operating mainly to safeguard regime security. This was manifested by its hegemony and control of all the body politics of Ethiopia. EPRDF being the chief architect in the liberalization of Ethiopia has pursued a strategy of manipulation of democratic political processes (Merera, 2003). The goal of such a political survival strategy is to open up the political arena under its full control. In doing so the EPRDF calculus targeted to achieve a sort of multi-party undertaking sufficient to attract support internally and externally (Brumberg, 1995), and at the same time to profit from an enhanced democratic image of the regime (Aalen & Tronvoll, 2008). To put this in another perspective, when the EPRDF perceived regime insecurity as a result of potential challenge from the contending opposition political parties, the regime swiftly closed political opening once again, and they suffer the full force of repressive intervention (Pausewang, 2002a). Hence the regime by doing so, displayed 'it's true colors and makes no pretense of being democratic' (Melakou, 2008, p. 448).

In this state of affair democracy 'cannot exist as long as the leadership prioritized the retention of power, and all resources are mobilized to secure the power of the incumbent leaders of the state' (Pausewang, 2002a, p. 177). On top of this, as its strategy the regime in power, 'assumes that it is the vanguard of the society by itself and that of the peasantry in particular' (Melakou, 2007, p. 16). In its conjecture, 'the ruling party is convinced it alone represents the interests of the peasants' (Pausewang, 2009, p. 70). In Ethiopia, where the peasantry constitute 85% of the total population, behind this assumption of the regime intention is to control the peasantry but not to empower (Melakou, 2007). For this purpose, the controlling mechanism was maintained through the rural kebelles[1] (ibid.). Actually, the demographic size of the peasantry which seems to represent the vote bank of the regime could actually so far sustain the regime survival. In this regard by controlling the peasantry, the EPRDF 'consolidate its power by making peasant association appendages to the party and retain life as usual which ultimately constitutes control or a political relationship' (ibid, p. 143). Moreover, as a vanguard party, EPRDF is not only concerned to control the peasantry alone to ensure its tenure.

It indeed envisage to control all organized expressions of society in urban areas and to make them all have to follow the party line the same level in the rural areas. For instance, in its 7th EPRDF Congress, the draft report of the party reaffirmed that 'the main focus of [EPRDF] political and organizational work in urban areas for the next two years will be extensive recruitment of vanguard forces recognized in connection with the development activities in the major sectors' (EPRDF, September 2008, p. 19).Certainly what derives from the above strategy of political survival is that the regime being a

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[1] It is system of neighborhood administration and it is the smallest government administrative unit in Ethiopia.

liberation movement insistently recognizes itself as the only custodian of the country and is legitimate enough to lead the country and hold power as long as it could (Clapham, 2005). For instance, it claims that it 'had come to power with immense sacrifice for the whole of Ethiopia and had 'the mandate of the rural masses' (Abbink, 2000, p. 159). The regime equated its sacrifices as a bargaining chip and thus could hardly share power; hence 'the subtext was that... [it] would not allow electoral loss' (ibid.). This is crucial truck for ensuring regime security and 'below the surface it has built [on] a party structure that keeps tight control at all levels and makes sure that no one uses these democratic institutions efficiently to challenge its power' (Pausewang, *et al.*, 2002b, p. 231). Whenever, independent opposition parties strongly challenge the regime, it resorted to supporting splinter opposition parties that not only undermine the party but also create confusion among the voters. For instance this was the case for Oromo National Congress as well as Coalition for Unity and Democracy party where the license and name of these parties were given to the respective minor splinter group. Moreover, the other tactic employed by EPRDF to ensure its regime security has been the use of force. Certainly, in any serious challenge against its power, it resorts to force to crush its opponents (Medhane, 2003). In fact 'as a result of the filature of its political management skills, the EPRDF regime has been obliged to depend more heavily on its control of the armed forces' (Clapham, 2009, p. 191). To sustain itself in power by force, the EPRDF utilized the police, the armed, the security and intelligence apparatuses (Pausewang, 2002a; Pausewang, *et al.*, 2002b; Yemane, 2008). In doing so, these forces in practice have served as an instrument of repression.

For instance, the army in Ethiopia is 'more an instrument for maintaining internal control than for safeguarding external security' (Pausewang, 2002a, p. 179). The other instrument particularly for urban repression of street protesters and opponents mass detention is the police (Toggia, 2009). Apart from the other role entrusted to the police during elections, it served the regime by 'arresting and incarcerate unwanted opposition candidates, beat up their followers, and influence or even deceive voters into voting for the government party' (Pausewang, 2002a, p. 180). Thanks to the recent anti-terrorism proclamation, in the name of fighting 'terrorist act' the regime significantly expanded the police power without due process guarantees (Human Rights Watch, 2009). Contemporarily, the regime organized one of the largest militaries in Africa. The military expenditure as a confidence building measure of the regime includes the significant spending on defense and security (Alemayehu, 2009b). With the exception of the years 1995, 1996 and 2007, Ethiopia's military expenditure under EPRDF has been more than 2 percent of its GDP (ibid.). However, this figure hardly realize as far as the regime's actual military expenditure is concerned. Undeniably in Ethiopia, besides the actual defense budget, 'the cost of the military forces has been spread across the budget of the Ministry of the Interior, the budget of the regional states [polices], administration and transport costs, and as investments' (Pausewang, 2002a, p. 178).

The Case of Regime Security in Sudan

The current political regime of Sudan came to power in 1989 by ending the third democratic experiment of the country through acoup d'état engineered by a military and civilian junta (Ibrahim, 2008). As of 1989 the army has been ruling the country in association with the leaders of the Islamic National Front who are 'supportes the military coup on the grounds that Islamic and the re-islamization of the Sudanese society were in danger' (Ambrosetti, 2007, p. 2). Particularly, in its first decade power, the regime 'dedicated to fundamental religious and ideological changes aimed at building an Islamic nation and society' (Maxted & Abebe, 2001, p. 50). At its inception, the regime's structure of power first is rested on a distinctly narrow base among a handful of Arabic-speaking riverine tribes, particularly the Shaggily and Jallien tribes (Young, 2007). Like its predecessor, the regime in power sustained its survival in this historic riverain core heartland of Sudan. Its rule characterized by the continuing dominance of these hegemonic group that has favored armed contestations of their power at the expense of both southerner and those from peripheral areas (Ambrosetti, 2007; Young, 2007). The other structural feature of the regime has been the constant association of these political forces with the army (ibid.). The amalgamation of these dominant political forces with the military 'led to the creation of a regime reliant upon Islam as upon militarism for its consolidation of power' (Washburne, 2009, p. 65).

The core objective of the regime's security strategy is ensuring its own survival (Ikome, 2008), and the political environment with in which it is operating is constructed around mainly safeguarding its security. Reminiscent of the practice of other regimes of the third world, the Islamic militarily regime of Sudan typically employs a mix of internal and external strategies aimed at regime survival that draw on a mix of carrot and stick approaches to challengers (Ibrahim, 2008; Jackson, 2007). Lacking wider social legitimacy, the regime is often not only forced to rely on coercive power and state intimidation, but also Islamic ideology to secure its continued rule. In this regard, the 'regime has followed a particular path during the 1990s relying on the promotion of a very specific brand of Islam and using symbolic gesture and military force to maintain its position in power' (Washburne, 2009, p. 66). The institutionnalisation of such approach in the body politics of Sudan not only generated political and economic marginalization in the social and geographical peripheries of the country, but also reinforced SPLM/A militarism (Rogier, 2005; Ambrosetti, 2007). Secondly, the regime organized a National Security Organization (NSO) that was made directly accountable to the President (Rogier, 2005).

This agency operates 'with impunity because they are instrumental to the head of state and accountable to him alone' (UNDP, 2009, p. 64). Currently, this security apparatus controls the course of Sudanese politics, it also determines Sudan's political path (Ibrahim, 2008). The regime 'policies and decisions on vital issues are made within the NSO and passed for implementation to the Council of Ministers or to the ruling party' (Rogier, 2005, p. 5). In official circles of the security services, Islamism remains influential (Glickman & Rodman, 2008). This apparatus is the most modern and well-organized and powerful institution in the country. It is also the richest thanks to its unlimited budget and the lack of any supervision over it, whether parliamentary or legal (Ibrahim, 2008; Rogier, 2005; Woodward, 2003). As Rogier (2005, p. 5) noted, the modus operandi of this security apparatus is characterized as follows:

For the sake of intelligence gathering, the NSO has penetrated the civil society through multiple organizations, business, unions, and various other entities active at all levels of society. This enables it to gather and analyze critical information at the economic, social, political, and security levels…the NSO receives significant human and financial resources. The recruitment process is very selective and prioritizes loyalty and political Islamic identity; as a result, NSO officials are given a free hand in performing their duties.

NSO being vital for the survival of the government (Rogier, 2005), the Bashir regime is 'more dependent on it than its own National Congress Party' (Ibrahim, 2008, p. 19). In connection to the security service, the regime had also built up a repressive police force. In an effort to consolidate control of government and enforce its vision of an Islamic state, 'the police forces have been politicized, i.e., they serve the ruling Islamic Movement rather than performing civil service duties' (Rogier, 2005, p. 5). As illustrative of this phenomenon, the regime has organized two police organs; namely 'the Public Order Police in charge of enforcing Islamic rules and regulations, notably in terms of dress codes and alcohol consumption and the Popular Police Force (a voluntary body that defends and promotes Islamic values, and is occasionally involved in fighting in the South)' (ibid.).

As UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in the Sudan (2008), and Woodward (2003) noted, the emergence of these powerful security networks that apparently enjoy a high degree of prerogatives appear to have been primarily responsible for the well-documented expansion of human rights abuses of all kinds. These agents of the regime are provided with legal personnel immunity. As the new Police Act of 2007 (Art.45.1) stipulated, 'no criminal procedures shall be taken against any Policeman, who committed any act which is deemed to be an offence, during or because of executing his official duties and he may not betried except by a permission issued by the Minister of Interior or whoever authorizes' (Secretariat of Legal Affairs and Constitutional Development, 2003, p. 21).In addition to the security forces, like other Africa's regimes' most common employed survival strategy, the incumbent regime in Sudan spend large sums of the national income in war machine and military supplies. Using the military apparatus, the regime has perpetrated violence and intimidation against real and perceived opponents of the regime (Deng, 2008; Jackson, 2007; Lewis, 2009; Prendergast, 2005).

According to Lewis (2009), statistics compiled from the World Bank (2007) data point out that, the total percentage of government expenditure on defense, national security, public order and safety from 2000 to 2006 is 31%, 28%, 28%, 24%, 16% 10% and 27% respectively. Witnessing from the nature of the regime and its internal security threats in different regions, it is speculated that such widespread military spending activity has been pervasive and long-lasting. The other internal strategy of the regime to ensure survival is the manipulation of peace processes dominated by the National Congress Party. Indeed, 'the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) and Eastern Peace Agreement may offer marginalized Sudanese a few seats at the table during the current 'transition' period, which hardly affect the outcomes and the 'dinner party' itself' (Jooma, 2007a, p.

6). The regime had thus, maneuvered and managed to 'ending any alliance of the marginalized, setting aside the attempt to overthrow the NCP' (Young, 2007, p. 6). This tactic is certainly the regime's divided and conquers strategy. It has succeeded in upsetting the uneasy alliances forged in the early days of conflict particularly among the Darfur rebel groups (Prendergast, 2005). As Young (2005, p. 100) argued about the CPA which is also true for DPA, this move of the regime realized the 'exclusivist narrow approach peace process… which concentrates power in the hands of the two belligerents and their leaders'. It also manifests 'a lack of a commitment to democratic values… the failure to bring other political forces and civil society organizations into the process' (Young, 2005, p. 111). The other strategy of the regime is the manipulation of identity to cultivate legitimacy and at the same time secure its survival against various challenges.

This was first demonstrated by the regime's complete reliance on its Arab and Islamist identity and its propagation of prominent Islamization program. For the regime, the 'Islamist' agenda has been manipulated as a popular form of mobilization to monopolize power and divide the communities (Deng, 2005; Jooma, 2007b). After winning the 1999 power struggle against al-Turabi, the Bashir regime 'no longer paints itself to justify its position as a fundamental Islamist one' (Washburne, 2009, p. 63), by dropping the al-Turabi faction, the regime retreated from its core Islamist roots and embraced African identity. As part of external strategy, such reversal of identity of the regime was manifested by its endeavor to conceptualize Sudan as an African country. From 2005 onwards; 'the regime relies much more on its African identity than on an Arab or Islamic one' (ibid., p. 68). As a case in point, the regime's leader speaks of his 'belief in a unified destiny for Africa' and he 'portrays Sudan as a legitimate African country, thus solidifying African support in institutions such as the UN and AU as well as portraying himself as a vital leader' (ibid.). Adopting an African identity and stance, helped the Bashir regime in 'dealing with the Darfur crisis on his own terms… [and] legitimize his regime among African nations and thereby fend off UN or US intervention' (ibid., p. 71).

Human Security in Ethiopia and Sudan

Taking individuals as its referent object of analysis, human security is 'demonstrated primarily in how secure people experience their daily life' (Pausewang, 2004, p. 1). As far as the status of human security in the respective countries of the Horn is concerned, it is at the lowest level in status (Khadiagala, 2008; Medhane, 2003; Taylor, 2008). Undoubtedly this phenomenon resulted from lack of commitment on the part of the governments of the region to human security issues (Medhane, 2004). In this sub region citizen insecurity principally results from state actions, including political exclusion, social discrimination, human rights abuses, absence of democratic institutions, and general political discontent (Salih, 1999; Thomas, 1999; Wasara; 2002). Consequently, the region has been under a situation of human security deficit. In particular, the civil and political rights of citizens in countries of the region have been violated gravely routinely. In the political culture of the regimes in the two countries, 'repression is the *ultimo ratio* of state power, and all regimes have certain properties that lend themselves to

the development of draconian practices' (Weitzer, 1984, p. 533). On the part of the population at large, fear is an enduring and pervasive challenge (Thomas, 2006).

The Case of Human Security in Ethiopia

All things remaining constant, 'human and democratic rights feature prominently among the factors that enhance human security' (Pausewang, 2004, p. 1). Hence, reviewing of human security situation in Ethiopia requires looking at the 1995 constitution. At a face value, human and democratic rights of citizens have been incorporated in the FDRE constitution. According to the incumbent constitution, individual civil rights, includes the right to life, liberty and security (Art. 14, 15, 16,17and 27), freedom of thought, religion and expression (Art. 29), freedom of movement, assembly and association (Art. 30, 31 & 32). The categorized political rights of the citizen comprise of freedom of political opinion (Art. 29), as well as the right to take part in government (Art. 38). What is more in this constitution is that, it also integrated the major international human rights conventions ratified by Ethiopia including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, International Covenants on Human Rights and international instruments (Art.13.2). Furthermore, institutionally the country also went great length and established not only the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission but also the Ombudsman in 2000.

The Ethiopian Human Rights Commission is entrusted with protection, respection and full enforcement of human rights, as well as taking the necessary measures where they are found to have been violated (Art.5). The Institute of Ombudsman is responsible for bringing about good governance, that is of high quality, efficient and transparent, and based on the rule of law by way of ensuring that citizens' rights and benefits provided for by law are respected by organs of the executive (Art.5). These constitutional provisions and institutional frameworks seem to represent that the regime's 'political commitment to the enforcement of human rights standards was demonstrably high' (Praeg, 2006, p. 200). However, the EPRDF's actual practice deviated from the stated principles (ibid.).Pausewang (2002a, p. 172) argued that the 'contradictions between constitutional rights and liberties and the reality…between the guarantee of human [and democratic] rights and the daily repression and control, are becoming increasingly evident' in Ethiopia. The basic explanation for this incongruity is the overriding effect of EPRDF's practices. This has been verified by the various reports complied by the Ethiopian Human Rights Council (EHRCO), Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and the US State Department.

These 'reports time and again, with no apparent decline, on human right violations by police and security forces, on torture in prisons, arbitrary arrests, even extrajudicial executions' (Pausewang, 2009, p. 69). The regime from time to time rejected such reports as a political agenda on one hand, and on the other hand it frequently stated that it is 'aware of its shortcomings in terms of human rights' protection (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of FDRE, 2008, p. 4). Yet, this statement of the regime is the usual way of its public relations gimmick whenever human rights issues went wrong. One cannot deny the fact that, Ethiopia is indeed facing 'tremendous challenges in terms of economic, political, social and cultural constraints in the enhancement of human right observance' (Vaughan & Tronvoll, 2003, p. 56). Above everything else, the regime has

seriousconstraints in the enhancement of human right observance and was not even keen to work together with the only local human right non-government organization in the country, namely the Ethiopian Human Rights Council (EHRCO). In Ethiopia violations of the rights to freedom of expression and association and freedom of the media have been linked to human insecurity. The EPRDF was not tolerant to see citizens utilize their freedom of expression, assembly and organization to challenge it. These rights which are included under the constitutional provision on human and democratic rights are not respected, which can lead to widespread human insecurity (Pausewang, 2004). On the part of the EPRDF, such intolerance and denial of citizens' rights was 'based not only on the political expression of opposing views *per se* but also from the weak constituency that it has in the country that caused human insecurity and the siege mentality' (Melakou, 2007, p. 155). The EPRDF regime has been quite intolerant to criticism and had frequently resorted to crackdowns on the country's private media (Gilkes, 1999; Vestal, 1999). This is demonstrated by the government's move that has intermittently blocked opposition websites and blogs since May 2006 (ICG, 2009; Smith, 2007). As a strategy of categorically rejecting criticism, the regime has seriously undercut these rights of individuals (ICG, 2009).

The Case of Human Security in Sudan

From its inception as an independent state, Sudan has been at the epicenter of various internal conflicts that makes its political system very unstable. The successive regimes in Sudan have been mobilizing national resources to fight one civil war after the other. As a result, the country has been at the forefront of African countries focusing on the protection of state security (Deng, 2008b). Certainly, these civil wars have been continuously undermining the state of human security in the Sudan. Like its predecessors, the incumbent government of Sudan is pursuing a regime centered security policy since it has been caught up with triple civil wars. This situation as well as the regime's repressive move has been compromising the human security of citizens. For instance, the record of the regime in Khartoum regarding the Darfur crisis demonstrated that the country is under a serious human security deficit (Harker, 2000; Reeves, 2007). This is attested by the fact that the current regime's 'handling of this events contributed to an archetypal illustration of the state's role in aggravating human insecurity' (UNDP, 2009, p. 65). With regard to human and democratic rights, for the first time in its tenure the regime came up with an Interim Constitution that incorporated the provision of these rights. Part two of this constitution under the section on Bill of Rights gives the Sudanese state a role to guarantee, protect, and fulfill these rights (Art. 27).

Accordingly to this constitution, civil rights of person includes right to life, dignity and the integrity (Art. 28); right to liberty and security (Art. 29); the right to freedom of conscience and religious creed (Art. 38); right to the freedom of movement and the liberty to choose residence (Art. 42.1); the right of equal pay for equal work (Art. 32); the right to the freedom of expression, reception of information, publication, and access to the press (Art. 39.1). The incorporated political rights are right of peaceful assembly; the right to freedom of association, including the right to form and join political parties, associations and trade or professional unions (Art.40.1); and the right and the opportunity to take part in the conduct of

public affairs (Art.41). The constitution also stipulated the establishment of a Human Rights Commission (Art.142), and its draft law was made public on October 18, 2006, but its establishment is lagging well behind schedule. Moreover, international human rights treaties, covenants and instruments ratified by the Republic of the Sudan are also part and parcel of this Bill of Rights (Art.27). In the institutional sense, the regime organized two types of human rights institutions, such as the Advisory Council on Human Rights (1992) attached to the Ministry of Justice and the Committee for Eliminating the Kidnapping of Women and Children (1998) that aim at putting an end to the problem of kidnapping persons (Arab Human Rights, 2009). While international conventions of human rights has been ratified and deemed as an integral part of the transitional constitution of Sudan, the regime's record of respect for human rights shows a wide gap between these constitutional provisions and the actual practice (UNDP, 2009).

The relationship of the regime to human rights is inherently problematic. Above all when one considers the state of civil and political right in the country, it has turned to be marked by violations that appear to be the norm (Sudanese NGOs Alternative Report, 2006). Indeed, the National Security Forces Act for 1999, the Press and Printed Materials Act of 2004 and the recent Press and Publication Act 2009 are the instruments through which the regime undermines and violates rights. As noted in the previous section, the security apparatus is engaged in a campaign of harassment, intimidation, and persecution targeting political opponents and human rights defenders in the absence of due process and juridical review (OBS, 2009; Rogier, 2005; United Nation Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Sudan, 2008). Indeed, the 'disproportionately powerful security apparatuses often combine to turn the state into a menace to human security, rather than its chief supporter' (UNDP, 2009, p. 53).By impeding the human security of its citizens, the regime ignores its responsibility vested on it by the constitution on the promotion of human rights (Fadayel-Bahou, 2007).

Even though, freedom of assembly is allowed by the constitution, the regime through NISS not only severely restricted this right in practice, but also formally banned rallies and public demonstrations in the country (US State Department, 2009). According to the Observatory for the protection of Human Rights Defenders (OBS) (2009), this security service systematically perpetrated arbitrary arrest and detention against political dissidents in Khartoum and other parts of northern Sudan. For the purpose of intimidating political opponents of the regime, the security forces occasionally attended opposition political meetings, disrupted opposition rallies, and summoned participants to security headquarters for questioning after political meetings (US State Department, 2009). The United Nations also documented numerous cases in which the NISS arbitrarily arrested and detained political dissidents. The fate of freedom of association in Sudan is also similar to the situation of freedom of assembly.

Conclusion

When one attempts to scrutinize the aforementioned plethora of human security issues of the region as focal point of research, the region is characterized by serious human security-deficit. When one comes to consider the two countries, in both cases the condition of human rights has been under a lot of condemnation from domestic human rights organizations, as well as external global actors and Academia. Second, *inter alia*, addressing the freedom from fear and freedom from want both countries manifest a resemblance context of human security deficit. The first resemblance, these two countries have protracted domestic insurgencies challenges as result of political repression, lack of accommodating opposition and egalitarian system. Essentially the human security of individuals is not given priority in the respective two countries of the region. In this region despite the rhetoric the authoritarian governments of the region used substantial amount of the state resources and power to achieve regime security at the expense of their citizens' human security. This has indeed not only put these countries in a state of political crises as a result of intrastate discord, but also erodes the political domain and curtailment of the political and democratic rights of the citizens in this region.

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